What does the translator do? Does she transcribe, performing an almost technical function? Or is she an inv entor, an interpreter, a kind of singer of lost songs? This is the question Benjamin posed as the translator's task (Benjamin); here I ex plore the possibility that translation is liturgy . Translation as either a technical transcription or interpretiv e interv ention neglects its core concern: ethics. Translation is dialogic, speaking from one language to another, y es, but also from a space between languages. The translator v oices, though she does not author. [1] The translator's orientation is alway s towards respect for another v oice -that of the source tex t. And the translator's task is alway s impossible, insofar as total respect (ciphered as total fidelity ) giv es way to what is inev itably "lost in translation." Whatev er the translator does, she is oriented alway s towards managing this loss, towards the ethical stakes of this loss. Seen in this light, whether she transcribes or inv ents becomes a v ery different question.
I am taking the concept of "liturgy " from Emmanuel Lev inas, whose dialogic recasting of ontology as ethics informs my rephrasing of the question of the translator's task. Lev inas characterizes liturgy as "the work of the same as a mov ement without return of the same to the other" (349) (350) , meaning that it is what the self undertakes when it wants to address itself to something completely alien, that is, to an absent div inity .
Here I dev elop liturgy as the activ e, embodied work of the translator as she reads, writes, and rereads. One of the main reasons for the binary nature of writing about translation is the fact that it is more concretely something one does. To talk about it is to make a metaphor almost immediately (leav ing aside the Derridean notion that to talk at all is to make metaphor, as in "White My thology "). Liturgy helps bring the work of translation back to the body , back to the desk where one tex t is read in a source language and then rewritten and reread in a new one.
Liturgy grounds translation in the body and consciousness of an "I" whose process happens only because she knows two (or more) languages, and is literate and thus able to render in one what she has read in another.
Liturgy also dev elops the notion of the translator as someone in between a speaking self and a kind of v entriloquist, whose words are not her own. In this way , liturgy becomes activ e, embodied practice oriented towards another. In ev ery case, the question is how to "do justice" to the source tex t, whether it's Dostoev sky or a trade document. If, as John
Durham Peters has argued (Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication), communication is
the central trope of our times, then the metaphors we undertake to characterize translation must be part of that discussion. The longing for fusion and the fear of alienation are both ex pressed in our thoughts about translation.
Its social role touches upon all our hopes for ov ercoming the chaos Babel wrought. As Pinchev ski has shown,
Lev inas' work is central to communication ethics (By Way of Interruption: Levinas and the Ethics of Communication).
Translation studies finds its way to this discussion v ia the notion of liturgy . Translation is a fundamental element in any conv ersation of communication ethics. As embodied practice, it constantly stages and restages an ethical stance and takes action. This action -what the translator "writes" -has consequences to which the theorist tries to attend. Herein lies translation's fundamental ethical orientation, which has, as described abov e, dominated the discussion in translation studies. As V enuti especially has shown (The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation), how we imagine the task of the translator has v ery real consequences for tenure and promotion, not to mention how we imagine the world around us, how we conceiv e of and encounter otherness. Translation studies has long understood its ethical stakes; its participation in a wider conv ersation of communication ethics enriches the latter ev en as it reformulates key questions for the former. In this sense, I suggest that the translator is the figure of communication ethics.
This essay begins with a discussion of Lev inas and his role in communication ethics. It then mov es to dev elop the concept of liturgy within the contex t of translation as an embodied, material practice. I end by suggesting that translation attends to what Lev inas calls the "trace of the face," that is, the appearance of the other to which the translator must respond ethically . This suggestion stages ethics as differences that "meet but do not touch," that is, that do not stage communication or translation as total assimilation of difference. In this I make my own claim about translation as practice and its ethics, and draw upon ex periences from my own work translating Museo de la Novela de la Eterna (Museum of Eterna's Nov el).
Lev inas
Lev inas' ethics is "first" philosophy , that is, its concerns are prior to the traditional philosophical inquiry into being, or ontology . For him, ontology implies a sov ereign consciousness knowing only itself. Lev inas opposes this "my th of Uly sses returning to Ithaca" with the "story of Abraham, who leav es his fatherland forev er for a y etunknown land" (348). For Lev inas, philosophy begins when I am confronted with another, with a Face, that I cannot wholly recognize or otherwise "return" to my stable, self-contained consciousness.
If I can know the Other, I hav e in some sense assimilated her, incorporated her, and her status as other is diminished. "To know amounts to grasping being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing, remov ing from it its alterity " (44). The Other is no longer other -she has been comprehended, reduced to the status of the known world, and thus no longer strange. The ethical moment happens in my stery , which is to say , in complete alterity , when I must confront my responsibility to a being that is utterly foreign to me.
This reconceptualization of ex istence as oriented towards the other rather than rooted in the self and the selfsame also entails a rethinking of ethics. For Lev inas the I is in fact "deriv ativ e" of this ethical relationship (Arnett, Arneson and Bell). Traditionally , ethics are understood as a series of codes or laws that are contingent upon the primary ontological question. After the "I" is established, what are the rules that might gov ern that subject's interaction with others? Not only does this mean that sociality is a kind of afterthought to the question of being but it also reduces ethics to an impersonal code deriv ed from this middle term (such as reason). Hence formulations like Kant's categorical imperativ e, which seeks to define univ ersal conditions for the ethical.
Lev inas' restaging of being as dialogic -that is, in communication with some other -also calls for an ethics oriented towards radical alterity .
For Lev inas, the notion of the univ ersality sought as equiv alency or equality is fundamentally opposed to any radical understanding of the ethical. The relation with the Other is precisely not sy mmetrical because it is ethical.
The Other proceeds me and ex ceeds me, and the demand she makes upon me is infinite and therefore impossible to satisfy . This is the crux of the ethical relation, for any attempt to seek equity entails the v iolence of assimilation: in seeking common ground, I am forced to eliminate the v ery uniqueness that makes the Other different from me. I reduce her difference to the same, and in so doing I fail in my responsibility to care for and respect her alterity as such.
Rather than understanding -so often a key word in popular pleas for a better, more ethical world -Lev inas posits responsibility , that is, a kind of intending-towards otherness that makes no attempt to assimilate or grasp it. In this sense, the relation with the Other is fundamentally asy mmetrical for Lev inas. The ethical mov e is not to rectify that asy mmetry by looking for univ ersal constants like human nature or inalienable rights.
Indeed, I am called to responsibility precisely because of the radical alterity of the Face. In appearing to me as a face, the other asks me not to do the v iolence required to make it understandable to me. Nev ertheless, Lev inas does not imply that this v iolence is to be av oided, or ev en that it can be av oided. The problem is that in our encounters, in the call of the other, is a call to a responsibility I must ultimately fail. It is this know ledge of failure that underwrites my reception of the call.
This responsibility founds my being. I only am, insofar as I am called to responsibility by an Other whose difference from me cannot be reduced to equiv alent terms. My responsibility founds my being precisely because there are no metaphors av ailable to forge similarity , no bridges of understanding to be built. I am because I am called to responsibility . To be is to stand in this untenable relation, to confront alway s a chasm that both calls for me to bridge it and y awns wider than I can ev er reach. 
Lev inas and Com m unication: T he Face
As we hav e seen, Lev inas' primary object of philosophical inquiry is not the singular self -ontology , or the question of being -but the plurality and sociability of responsibility . This call of the other -concretized in the face of the other -is the foundational moment of being, in all its messy , contingent, and embodied complex ity . To be is to be responsible for an Other who ex ceeds me, and whose difference from me I shall nev er fully assimilate or understand.
In refounding the philosophical project in the relation and the ethical call of the Other, Lev inas necessarily places great importance on language. It is within language that the asy mmetrical relation is possible, for languagecommunication -reaches out towards the Other, engaging her in conv ersation. This communicativ e relation, because it is an ex change wherein the self ex tends bey ond itself not to establish a border or a limit (limitrophe), but so as to create a space for sociability , does not seek to assimilate the Other to knowledge. It is dull to conv erse only with oneself: in sociability , we seek others precisely in their alterity , and so allow for this relation of asy mmetry wherein the Other continues to baffle my attempts to comprehend her.
We shall try to show that the relation between the same and the other -upon which we seem to impose such ex traordinary conditions -is language. For language accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe within this relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same, remains transcendent to the same. The relation between the same and the other, metaphy sics, is primordially enacted as conv ersation, where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as an 'I,' as a particular ex istent unique and autochthonous, leav es itself (Totality and Infinity 39).
Lev inas is v ery clear that the presentation of the Other to me is concrete: it takes the form of a face. The face comes to me from an unknown location, it comes to me from elsewhere, bey ond my sphere of knowledge and understanding. And y et because it is a face, because it is a concrete manifestation of otherness that intrudes into my world y et takes the form of the utterly human, it calls me to responsibility . "The way in which the other presents himself, ex ceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroy s and ov erflows the plastic image it leav es me... It expresses itself" (51 ).
There is no idea that corresponds to the face, for the face precedes ontology , precedes my being. In order for this ethical relation to work as asy mmetrical and irreducible to intellectual notions of shared humanity or obligation, the call of the other to responsibility that founds my being must appear to me as a face, as something that is both utterly human and irretriev ably different from me. Otherwise its call would not hav e the urgency and the strength to justify my entire ex istence. It must be real, tangible, and y et it must be powerful. The face is a "mode" that "ex presses itself" -that is, it is activ e, and it is communicativ e. Its ex istence is not static, it calls -this is the modeand this call is prior to any idea I might hav e of it. The call is ex pressiv e -not intellectual, not reasoned -and in implicating me, it brings me into an ex istence founded on a relationship, on language and communication. [I]f communication thus bears the sign of failure or inauthenticity [as the despair or pathos of solitude], it is because it is sought as fusion. One sets out from the idea that duality should be transformed into unity -that the social relation should end in communion. This is the last v estige of a conception identify ing being and knowingthat is, the ev ent by which the multiplicity of the real ends up referring to one sole being, and by which, through the miracle of clarity , ev ery thing I encounter ex ists as hav ing come out of me...The failure of communication is the failure of knowledge. One does not see that the success of knowledge would in fact destroy the nearness, the prox imity of the other. A prox imity that, far from meaning something less than identification, opens up the horizons of social ex istence, brings out all the surplus of our ex perience of friendship and lov e, and brings to the definitiv eness of our identical ex istence all the v irtuality of the non-definitiv e (Proper Names 1 04).
This "prox imity " is the space wherein the face appears to me and calls me forth in my being as being-for-another.
Communication understood as fusion owes too much to the ideal of knowledge, and knowledge destroy s the rarified, charged air of this prox imate space by collapsing distances into equiv alences. Communication may be differently understood, howev er, as the grounding for a relation prior to the question of being: "This 'say ing to the
Liturgy
So what is Lev inas' notion of liturgy , and how does it help us restate the question of translation? Lev inas dev elops the term in his essay "The Trace of the Other," which, not incidentally for our purposes, was originally published in September 1 963 as "La Trace de L'Autre," in the German language journal Tijdschrift voor Philosophie. The English v ersion I hav e is ex cerpted from this (I do not know if the French was translated into German for the journal or if it appeared in French) and translated by A. Lingis as part of an edited collection on deconstruction's philosophical roots. Liturgy is one of the attitudes towards the other that Lev inas identifies in his sketch of his relational ontology .
Liturgy is an "absolutely patient action." It is a "putting out of funds at a loss" (350). Patience is required for the long recitation of a liturgy , especially as the pious in the Jewish tradition pray sev eral times a day . The Amidah, or "standing pray er," usually takes about ten minutes and inv olv es chanting, reading, and ritually bowing at prescribed passages. The patience required to undertake this liturgy , this recitation of the same words in the same way sev eral times a day , is for Lev inas what underwrites liturgy as "ethics itself." Now, Lev inas is not particularly speaking of the Amidah or any other specific religious practice. Lev inas' cultural background was Jewish and he is well known as a student of Martin Buber and thus of Jewish theology . In "The Trace of the Other," howev er, he makes it clear that he's not speaking of religion as such. "We must for the moment remov e from this term ev ery religious signification, ev en if a certain idea of God should become v isible, as a trace, at the end of our analy sis" (350).
Ethics "itself" is thus jux taposed to ethics conceiv ed as a self returning to the same, or as a "cult" (350) of good deeds and rules. Ethics itself is a kind of attitude towards the other that, like liturgy , "puts out funds at a loss." To use communication scholar Amit Pinchev ski's formulation, "differences touch without merging" (1 26) between the reciter of the liturgy and the absent One to whom it is addressed. Ethics as such must know how to encounter an "other absolutely and not with respect to some relativ e term" (347 ) -to undertake the relation with a radical conception, a "mov ement of the same unto the other which nev er returns to the same (348). This is ethics as such, an ethics prior to selfhood, an ethics that constitutes the self as being.
In what I can term the "liturgical" relation, then, she who undertakes to pray undertakes "a relationship with the other who is reached without showing himself touched" (349). Here we see a fundamental asy mmetry whose ev ery day undertaking is ex emplified in the attitude of the pious. In its "absolutely patient action" (350), liturgy is an embodied recitation of words not 'one's own,' that is, which the speaker has not inv ented. [2] Nev ertheless his recitation of these words, his body ing-forth of them, is deeply important in the relation he is forging. It is the v ery act of bringing these words forth, of offering them, which constitutes the meaningfulness of the act.
Lev inas and T ranslation: Prox im ity
Should a successful translation actually seek to erase the traces of its foreign prov enance? The pitfall of inv isibility as a translator's ideal (V enuti) is that it may , at its limit point, actually suppress ev ery thing that makes the tex t unique and worth translating in the first place. Such concerns highlight the connection between translation and colonization, and the inev itable return of the repressed. What is lost in translation often ends up haunting the tex t, prov oking retranslation. There are few translations, ev en of the Bible, that can be considered definitiv e. No translation is ev er able to completely erase the trace of the other -the trace of the source tex t.
What our discussion of Lev inas makes clear, howev er, is that such claims are part of an ongoing encounter with alterity that is still conceptualized in terms of the self-same, in terms of knowledge (the "truth" of a particular tex t), rather than recognizing the irreducible otherness of the translated tex t from its source, despite their undeniable relation. This paradox ical relationship -of a two tex ts that are at once irreducibly different and undeniably related -is best understood in terms of the Lev inasian notion of proximity.
For Lev inas, the Other is neither distant nor assimilated but prox imate. As we hav e seen, he characterizes the relationship with the Other as "a distance which is also prox imity " (Ethics and Infinity 1 1 ) . The Other does not just ex ist near me, she addresses me across the distance that separates us. She stands face to face with me, and this face is the manifestation of what, regarding me, has nothing to do with me (does not regard me). It is through the face that the Other signifies "thou shalt not kill", or "responsibility for the unique one." It is through language that this relation unfolds, within a prox imate distance that may be imagined as the space between two interlocutors. "Prox imity " is the term that allows for differences to touch without merging into undifferentiated equanimity .
"Truth arises where a being separated from the Other is not engulfed in him, but speaks to him. Language, which does not touch the Other, ev en tangentially , reaches the Other by calling upon him or by commanding him or by obey ing him, with all the straightforwardness of these relations" (Totality and Infinity 62). Conv ersation's ex change only is possible in prox imity -within a space that is neither impossibly distant nor homogenous and identical.
Translation brings tex ts into prox imity : it mov es a source tex t into the target language without reducing them to the same tex t. Translation produces a tex t that is different from its source tex t, y et alway s and inex tricably in conversation with that tex t. One can no more div orce the translation from its original than one can claim that the original and the translation are identical. Translation ex ists in the "straightforwardness" of a relation between difference and identity , which is why translators like V enuti often critique the status of the translator as technician or craftsman. Y et it is this v ery straightforwardness that allows for prox imity , since the space of calling or commanding or obey ing is neither tangible nor theoretical. Just as translation occupies a space between theory and practice, so the Lev inasian relation between one and another happens between two interlocutors who speak but importantly do not touch.
Translation stretches communication "to its limits, towards the Other" (Pinchev ski 1 3). It highlights the ethical stakes of communication because, as Pinchev ski notes, they are highest wherev er "there is a risk of misunderstanding, lack, and refusal" (7 ). The fact of translation itself in its essence risks "misunderstanding, lack, and refusal." A Lev inasian perspectiv e on translation recasts this risk as part of the space of prox imity : to bring two tex ts into this space is to put them in relation, not to construe them in terms of what they 'v e lost or gained in translation. In prox imity , tex ts do not touch or merge, but they do relate. The both/and structure of the translation -as independent tex t and a representation of a tex t in another language -loses its abstraction and becomes the practical y et deeply ethical work of making conv ersation. Translation is an image without resemblance: a representation that stands in asy mmetrical relation to its referent. Figure   I hope it's beginning to be clear why the translator might be the figure of a certain kind of Lev inasian ethics. The translator herself also brings forth words that are not her own in the serv ice of an absent other. And, like the liturgist, the translator's embodiment of those words -her reading them and then translating them -puts her in a relation of prox imity to this other, which is nev er wholly grasped despite the work she had undertaken. Let us then turn to the translator as an ethical figure to dev elop this analogy .
Liturgy and Prox im ity : T he T ask of the T ranslator as Ethical
If a translator's work is ov erlooked in a rev iew, say s the Italian translator William Weav er, she should consider it a compliment, for inv isibility is the mark of a successful translation (cited in V enuti 3). "Inv isibility " here might more precisely be described as fluency or transparency : translation should not call attention to itself by disrupting the flow of the source tex t, but should be as a window into the original, whose ex tra-tex tual meaning is implicitly defined as somehow detachable and communicable by the skilled hand of the technician/translator. This is why scholars, who are trained to be so attentiv e to tex t and who spend their liv es reading, nev ertheless often ov erlook the work of translation unless it is ex plicitly a part of their discipline (as, for ex ample, in Comparativ e Literature).
Lawrence V enuti writes that the translator's inv isibility -and the attendant concern for transparency in translation -results from fear of "the drift of language away from the conceptual signified, away from communication and self-ex pression" (4).
Scholars and artists alike v alue their unique contributions, and do not like to think that their tex tual children may grow up and drift away , forming other chains of signification in other contex ts, both historical and cultural. A successful translation is securely anchored to the original, a tethering that necessitates the inv isibility of the translator, whose work would only remind us that the original and the translation cannot, by definition, be identical. We v alue transparency in translation because to read in translation requires a certain leap of faith.
Indeed, the act itself of writing implies not only the need to communicate but also a faith in the possibility of communication. Ev en the most postmodern, obscure tex t reaches out to an Other; otherwise, it would not be a tex t, it would not signify . To put this observ ation into Lev inasian terms, "if communication and community is to be achiev ed, a real response, a responsible answer must be giv en. This means that I must be ready to put my world into words, and to offer it to the other" (Totality and Infinity 1 4). The act of translation implies a belief in some ex tra-tex tual meaning that is portable and transferable -and by ex tension, a belief in the ultimate connectedness of all languages. Walter Benjamin wrote that translation points to "the predestined, hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages" (7 5); Franz Rosenzweig similarly claimed that translation is possible "because in ev ery language is contained the possibility of ev ery other language" (1 7 1 ).
Nev ertheless, both writers also claim that this state of "pure language" is simultaneously the condition of possibility for translation and also its inev itable downfall. Just as in the history of the idea of communication (Peters) , translation is conceiv ed in terms of unity and isolation, as either seamless fusion or hopeless cacophony .
The challenge is therefore to preserv e the richness of linguistic alterity while pursuing the common ground that translation posits. One way to think about this challenge is to remember that, in Amit Pinchev ski's words, "ev ery act of translation inv olv es an approach from 'here' to 'there,' imply ing that say ing is not only in a certain dialect but saying to another dialect, contex t, indiv idual, community " (1 42). That is, translation is in its essence dy namic, embracing source language and target language in one practice. To theorize that practice is to look to a relation and a mov ement, rather than looking to static notions of identity and difference.
The ety mological roots of the word translation support this notion, as the word literally means to mov e from one place to another, to trans-lare, or mov e across. A secondary meaning of the word translation thus inv olv es this notion of phy sical, rather than linguistic transfer. Too often we focus on one side of this approach, either fretting about the fidelity of a translation (has it been thoroughly taken from "here"?) or deploring its readability "there,"
in the target language. Both concerns are legitimately applicable to the practice of translation, but theoretically speaking, it may be helpful to find a way to keep in mind the notion of transfer that links them. Like the mov ement of metaphor, the structure of the relation that translation embraces is both/and, or is like/is not. It is both its own tex t and a deriv ativ e; it is like the source tex t, and it is not the source tex t. Understanding the relation of transfer rather than the poles it oscillates between allows us to see theorize an ethics of translation that neither reduces all differences nor discounts translation's important work towards mutual understanding.
Source T ex t as Face
If we then accept the figure of the translator as an ethical communicator, what now does her work look like? What is the task of this reconfigured translator? Her task is in the space of proximity of tex ts -the source tex t and the one she will produce -but also the reading she undertakes. This reading is something like the appearing of another in her world. The translator as ethical communicator understands that this reading is an encounter with another first and foremost. She understands that she -her tex t -only is able to ex ist insofar as this reading stages her responsibility towards the source tex t. Her tex t depends upon her reading of the source tex t. The translator as ethical communicator knows this and is oriented therefore towards loss and failure, in her deep recognition of an alterity that cannot be returned to the self same, that is, to understanding or mastery . The translator as ethical communicator does not seek to master the source tex t.
The translator thus undertakes her task in the contex t of responsibility towards the source tex t. Her reading of the source tex t places her in prox imity to it, allows it to appear to her from a place beyond, a place inconceiv able ev en as another world ("The Trace of the Other"). How does the translator work to construct this world, understand the tex t's prox imity ? She might read the author's biography ; she might, as I did, trav el to the places he inhabited and speak with members of his family . Some translators work closely with liv ing authors and I think the argument here still holds -the tex t is still an appearing-from-elsewhere ev en when the author is there to talk to y ou about it.
Liturgy : T he T ask of the T ranslator
And then the translator takes up her task of writing. She takes up her pen and begins her liturgy . She recites what she has read -for translation is in some sense a recitation, a rehearsal of something that is already written. Y et at the same time she is composing, she is changing words and mov ing around clauses because she is listening, ev er so carefully , to this trace of the other -to what the tex t spoke to her of, to what this tex t suggested to her about another. She will hav e to make hard decisions constantly , decisions that affect the so-called "domestication" of the tex t. Some of them she might ev en make against her better judgment, because an editor has asked for a clarification or deemed the original rendering too opaque. So she writes and rewrites, recites and recites again.
